MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Globalism is global. The U.S. is one nation out of 191. Globalism emphasizes the whole. Sovereignty emphasizes the part, the individual nation. What happens if under the banner of globalism 190 gang up on the one, forcing the sovereign one to yield to the global whole? That's the down side and the risk of globalism.

Let's get concrete. Let's talk about an up-and-coming nation in our hemisphere that said no to globalism, that said no to the World Trade Organization, the WTO, when the U.S. was the one nation that tried to use the WTO, tried to use globalism and its bludgeon on it.

Issue one: Globalism versus AIDS.

KOFI ANNAN (secretary-general, United Nations): (From videotape.) HIV/AIDS is a global problem of catastrophic proportions. The world has never before faced a pandemic such as this. More than 4 million children have already died from AIDS before they reached the age of 15.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Of all the countries in this hemisphere, Brazil is the hardest-hit per capita by the scourge of AIDS. To cope with the calamity, Brazil last year invoked sovereign laws which allow it to suspend intellectual property rights in cases of national emergency. By so doing, Brazil set free its pharmaceutical industry to produce generic anti-AIDS drugs.

But Brazil is also a member of the 142-nation World Trade Organization, the WTO. It requires members to protect intellectual property rights, not suspend them.

Enter the USA. Washington complained to the WTO to block Brazil's action, saying that free trade in pharmaceuticals was being compromised by Brazil, an accusation that Brazil scorned.

MR. GRESSER: (From videotape.) We are not discussing free trade, we are discussing the interests of U.S. pharmaceutical industry, not free trade as a whole.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: The U.S. complaint was undertaken on behalf of U.S. pharmaceutical companies that hold the patents to anti-AIDS medication.

There you have it, the case is a classic conflict between a state's sovereign rights -- Brazil's -- in direct conflict with Brazil's WTO commitment and obligation.

Question: Does Brazil have to stand idly by while its citizens die of AIDS because patented drugs are unaffordable? Did Brazil do the right thing by letting anti-AIDS generic drugs be manufactured, invoking its sovereign privilege against its WTO commitment?

John Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: I think it did the wrong thing, not because it violated WTO commitments, but because it put itself at risk of scaring off foreign private investment in trade by ignoring these intellectual property rights. Brazil had other options to deal with AIDS; it didn't have to go the way it did.


MS. CLIFT: Brazil did exactly the right thing. First of all, they now have a model program for attacking AIDS that is going to set the pace, I hope, for the rest of the world.

Second, the pharmaceutical companies had a -- it was a public relations disaster in a similar situation with South Africa where they didn't have the low-cost drugs, and they eventually backed away.

Thirdly, Brazil could invoke, under WTO rules, a state of emergency and allow those kinds of drugs to be manufactured, clearly within their rights.

Fourthly, the Bush administration backed off. They withdrew the suit and they're going to work it out separately with Brazil. That all adds up to me to a big victory for Brazil in doing the right thing.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Did you know that that could have been invoked, an emergency lever that would have sprung them out of the WTO?

MR. BLANKLEY: Well, yeah, that provision exists. It would have to have been reviewed to see whether it applied in this issue.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: That would take a long time, presumably.

MR. BLANKLEY: Yeah, but the interesting thing that Eleanor talks about correctly, the public relations component of this sort of a decision, Undersecretary Bolton talks about the consequences of violating the WTO --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Which redound to the financial damage to the pharmaceutical company.

MR. BLANKLEY: Yeah. And these show the danger to individual sovereign states as we move into a time where full sovereignty probably won't be exercised as fully. But yes, you can continue to exercise your rights, but depending on the PR of it and how the media covers it, they may come down on you as an nation; prices that are too high for a country to have to pay. And that's the danger of moving in this direction.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Edward, Bush is handling this bilaterally, and my question to you is, since he's not handling it multilaterally, do you think that this is more Bush anti-globalism?

MR. GRESSER : No, not at all. This is a reasonable decision by the Bush administration and pretty consistent with the Clinton administration's policy. The WTO has a clause, as Tony said, that allows you to suspend patent rights in a health emergency. Brazil has been a little bit clever in this in that the clause we've complained about goes well beyond not only AIDS drugs, but all drugs and all other patented products. They've not chosen to exercise this with regard to auto parts or rocket engines or whatever, but we've reserved the right to challenge them if they do. And on the whole, I think we've done the right thing.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: The pharmaceutical companies contend that if they can't protect their patents then they can't conduct their research, and that redounds negatively to the public welfare. Do they have a point?

John Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: I think they're exactly right. Over the long term this will discourage investment in the very health care and life-saving drugs that people need.

I think one important point about the way the Bush administration is handling this is to avoid the judicialization of the WTO; to keep this what it fundamentally ought to be: political discussions among the member nations.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: He's invoking the bilateral mechanism.

MS. CLIFT: The notion --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But you see this as PR?

MS. CLIFT: I'm just saying, the drug companies do not want to get in the position of looking like they're sanctioning tens of thousands of people dying unnecessarily. It takes about $500 million to bring a drug to market. But if you look at the drug companies, they spend collectively now more on marketing than they do on research. Their profits are quite healthy. So I think there is some margin here for maneuvering when you have lives at stake in a kind of a mass situation like this.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You know that if a similar situation happened in the United States, let us say in the depths of a depression, and patented drugs were just too expensive, the United States would go forward with generic drug manufacture. You know that. It would not yield the common good, the public health, to a patent concern, would they?

MR. BLANKLEY: Well, currently, and in the past, given our massiveness in the world, we could probably go around and do what we want. As time progresses, if our relative strength should diminish, we might fall under the pressure that could come to bear on lesser countries today.

When Mr. Bolton talks about invoking bilateral rather than judicial components of WTO, it's an important point because when you're bilateral, you're in the old pre-globalism relationship between two nations consenting to agreements between each other. When you start getting into international organizations that have self-executing procedures, you're now into a zone where the consent of the nation is no longer part of the decision-making progress and I think you're slipping then down a slope.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Right. Well, we know from recent Bush history that he knows how to deal one-on-one. And of course that always provides greater opportunity for negotiation maneuver than does the actions of this kind of organization we're talking about here.

Exit. I want to finalize the answer here. Which should take precedence, a government's responsibility to take care of its citizens who are afflicted with a communicable, deadly disease, or its World Trade Organization obligation?

John Bolton.

MR. BOLTON: Well, I don't think they're inconsistent. I think Brazil found the wrong way to deal with it.


MS. CLIFT: Well, John is right in the sense they're not inconsistent. The WTO has a clause that allows Brazil to do exactly what it did.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And you would say that the United States found the wrong way to deal with it?

MS. CLIFT: No -- no. The Bush administration found a way to finesse it so as to allow this to go forward.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Right. But your administration -- the Clinton administration, that originated all of this, it found the wrong way to proceed; i.e., carrying it right to the WTO on the strength of intellectual property domain.

MS. CLIFT: Right, and it was a public relations disaster for the drug companies.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Which takes precedence? You think precedence is the public health in this instance, the emergency, yes?

MR. BLANKLEY: I think Brazil -- the Brazilian officials were correct in asserting their own sovereignty, and that's certainly going to be more popular back home. However, the danger is, of course, that there could be negative effects on Brazil that, in net, could be more damaging, perhaps, over time than that decision.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Now, Tony, that's a very good political answer, I mean addressing it through a political lens. But we're talking theory here. Which should take precedence?

MR. BLANKLEY: Well, for my taste, I think the sovereign state should be able to assert its rights under all circumstances. It's the ultimate and supreme expression of authority.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What do you think?

MR. GRESSER : The public health takes precedence. That patent law is an answer to really a tragic dilemma. We all want cheaper and more affordable medicines; we all want better and improved medicines. The patent law tried to strike the balance of giving the companies encouragement to create new ones, but also giving you an escape clause if there's a public health emergency, which does come first.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What takes precedence is the government's obligation to protect public health through the exercise of its sovereignty.

When we come back, permanent International Criminal Court with global and universal jurisdiction. The U.S. will have no part of it. No ganging up on us by a world court. Is the U.S. right?


MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Issue two: Globalism versus Westphalia. The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648. It brought to an end the bloody 30-years war that slaughtered one-third of the people of Central Europe. Westphalia ended religious warfare between rival Catholic and Protestant forces by recognizing that each state had the sovereign right to settle religious matters within its own borders without external interference: "cujus regio, ejus religio" -- "whose country, his religion". This precept is the nucleus of the doctrine of non-interference in another country's domestic affairs. At its time, the Westphalian doctrine was an enlightened human rights policy crafted to end religious warfare and stabilize a Europe divided between Catholic and Protestant faiths.

Enter the 20th century and its genocidal horrors: Auschwitz, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Bosnia. A new human rights credo has arisen, the doctrine that intervening in a country can prevent religious or ethnic conflict within that country's sovereign borders is both permissible and desirable. Interventionism.

"Today the Westphalian order is in systemic crisis. Its principles are being challenged, though an agreed alternative has yet to emerge. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states has been abandoned in favor of a concept of universal humanitarian intervention or universal jurisdiction." So writes former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, condemning interventionism in his latest book.

Interventionism was enthusiastically embraced by William Clinton. Supra-national authorities, say the humanitarian interventionists, is the only way to guarantee human rights against abuses by sovereign states. This is the doctrine that set the stage for NATO's air war against Yugoslavia, also NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Such interventions have produced proposals to create a standing army for the United Nations.

Question: Is non-interference vital to democracy? Are the two concepts inseparable?

Eleanor Clift?

MS. CLIFT: I think once the Holocaust happened and the world witnessed that horror, that democracy could not go forward with a straight face by staying out of other countries' internal affairs. And I think humanitarianism has appropriately become a reason to get involved. And frankly, this is the modern world, the CNN effect -- you cannot have, you know, pictures streaming across your screen and not get involved. But there are lots of places in the world where we don't get involved as well.


MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You notice Tony is heaving in his chair? That means he's just about ready to lunge!


MS. CLIFT: That's fine! (Laughs.)

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: She believes that supra-national diktat can take the place of elected representatives and their actions and votes.

What do you think?

MR. BLANKLEY: Yeah, I couldn't disagree more. The whole point about a sovereign country and why it's legitimate is because it governs with the consent of the governed, through representative democracy. Once you turn over those decision-making responsibilities beyond the level of the nation to international bureaucrats or organizations or associations, there is no consensual endorsement of their action and you're moving away from democratic government and toward some sort of oligarchic tyranny.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yes, but you must admit that some human rights abuses are so vicious and animalistic that you should be willing to suspend the sovereignty right.

MR. BLANKLEY: No, if sovereign nations want to go and invade a country like Germany, which is fine with me, during World War II to beat them back for what they're doing, that's fine. But to then justify it that there's something above sovereignty is, to me, the most dangerous of slippery slopes.

MS. CLIFT: With all due respect, that was a lot of Westphalian ham, I think. (Laughter.)

MR. BLANKLEY: You've been planning that one!

MS. CLIFT: I have been planning that from the beginning, ever since I learned about the Westphalian Treaty~!

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: So we can say that Hitler and Pol Pot and Stalin caused the questions to be raised about Westphalian legitimacy. Shall we say that, John Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: You could say that, but we're really missing the question here. The question for the United States' sovereignty, which is all that I really care about, is whether we maintain our constitutional structure of government, whether we decide questions that affect us, or whether we lose our autonomy and our popular sovereignty in a web of international agreements and organizations. That's what the key political debate is about in this country. It's why people dissatisfied with legislative results go outside of our system and try and get international agreements to regulate domestic issues.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Can you speak to this, Edward? You were an assistant to Ms. Barshefsky, who was the U.S. Trade Representative. What's the angle you see in this issue?

MR. GRESSER: Well, I think what the undersecretary is saying is something like what you'd have heard from Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover and the Republicans of the '20s.

MR. BOLTON: Thank you very much.

MR. GRESSER: We can stay out of the world's problems and live our own lives and make our own decisions.

We've found out the world comes to get us. You know, you can't have such a clear and sharp separation from the outside world.

MS. CLIFT: Right. He articulated an "America first" policy here that --

MR. BLANKLEY: No, wait a second, I'm not going to let that get by because that's exactly --

MS. CLIFT: (Laughs.) I hardly got it out of my mouth before you won't let it go by!

MR. BLANKLEY: You cannot say that those people who insist on our sovereignty are therefore isolationist. This is part of a tick-tock that's going on in Washington these days. You can be interventionist, you can be internationalist and still assert the sovereignty of the United States. We've been that way through much of our history, certainly during World War II, certainly during the Cold War period. We were interventionists, we were acting in behalf of the interests of the world, but we were not giving up our sovereignty.

MR. GRESSER: The Korean War?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: If you carry this principle that you advocate to a logical conclusion, you would say that in a fierce ideological and religious conflict, as is going on in -- was going on in Kosovo and in Chechnya, then the intrusion into sovereignty is okay. But you would also have to then concur that we would be on the threshold of a world war, if that were to take place; would you not?

MR. GRESSER: We'd be on a threshold of world war if what were to take place?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: If you were to involve a state interfering in the activities -- an outside state -- the activities in Chechnya in order to try and quiet the situation, that that would involve a world war. Now, what price are you willing to pay --

MR. GRESSER: Not that price.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- what limits do you want to put on interference in a country's sovereignty?

MR. GRESSER: The U.S. isn't going to go and solve all the world's problems. It can solve some of them. It did solve the war in Bosnia. It was a good thing to do. The war in Bosnia was an outrage --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You think that situation -- we are now in a state of resolution in Bosnia?

MR. GRESSER: We are not in a state of genocide, where we were in 1994, '95 -- '92, '91. We're in a better situation now than we were morally because we stopped this, and politically because it was eating away at the heart of NATO.

MS. CLIFT: Yeah. And we don't have to talk about this theoretically. I mean, there are actual treaties out there that the Bush administration is scrapping in terms of arms control, global warming, in this notion that international courts impinge on our sovereignty. Well, the climate belongs to everybody and --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Let's pull it together. We've got to get out.

Which offers greater global stability, the Westphalian order or international humanitarian intervention?

John Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: Westphalia.


MS. CLIFT: International humanitarian intervention, clearly. We are not an island nation, we are part of a world community.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What do you think?

MR. BLANKLEY: I'd rather be governed by Americans than by Brussels bureaucrats.

MR. GRESSER: Westphalian, but in the extreme case, as the Holocaust shows.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I think Westphalia. Westphalia is a recipe for peace. I think humanitarian interventionism, unless it's an extreme case, is a recipe for war.

Issue three: Globalism versus justice.

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (former Yugoslav president): (From videotape.) I consider this tribunal forced tribunal and indictments forced indictments, so I have no need to appoint counsel to illegal order.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: So declared former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague in the first-ever trial of a head of state before an international war crimes tribunal.

Adolf Hitler committed suicide before capture and so avoided standing trial at Nuremberg. For political reasons, Japan's Emperor Hirohito was given a pass by the allies, despite his complicity in well-documented Japanese atrocities. These include the Rape of Nanking, the sexual enslavement of thousands of Asian and European so-called "comfort women"; the decapitation of captured American pilots, the Bataan Death March, and ghoulish experimentation on prisoners of war in Japanese/German chemical warfare laboratories.

But Slobodan Milosevic got no pass. Rather than letting him stand trial in Belgrade, the U.S. and the E.U. insisted on his surrender to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia at The Hague. Milosevic's trial is seen as a test run for a more ambitious United Nations undertaking, the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court with global jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Once the ICC is ratified by 60 nations, it can indict anyone anywhere, provided three of its 18 judges concur, even a citizen of a state that refuses to ratify the treaty or recognize the ICC.

Suppose a citizen of the United States faces ICC extradition and the United States refused to extradite the citizen of the United States. What do you think the upshot would be?


MR. GRESSER: He'd stay here.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: He'd stay here?

MR. GRESSER: If the United States refused to extradite a citizen, the citizen isn't going to leave the United States.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And do you think that that would ravage the court, undermine it? And would that be a good idea?

MR. GRESSER: If the court was illegitimately asking for the extradition of a citizen, yes, and it would be a good thing.

But there is a case underway right now where we have extradited a legal resident of the United States to Rwanda to face trial for genocide, and it's a good thing.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Suppose that the ICC decided that Bob Kerrey, let us say, was guilty of war crimes and, therefore, should appear before the tribunal. What would be the impact if the United States were to surrender Bob Kerrey for that kind of activity, and what do you think of the whole -- this whole subject, John Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: The United States is not going to join the ICC within the lifetime of anybody watching this program. The most likely result for the ICC is it will be just as much of a joke on the international scene as the existing International Court of Justice. The risk is that the prosecutor will actually have power. It will be a highly politicized, highly anti-American institution.

MS. CLIFT: Well, the U.S. has pushed for the creation of the court at The Hague to try Milosevic. We're perfectly happy to have a temporary court. We don't want a permanent court because we're afraid --

MR. BOLTON (?): That was created by the Security Council.

MS. CLIFT: -- that some of our officials -- notably, Henry Kissinger's name has come up -- would be tried for various crimes. But the court has to be ratified by a number of countries. Its creation is off in the future, and it will -- probably will go ahead without the U.S.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Holbrooke, Clinton, Blair and Albright all called Milosevic a "war criminal." If he stood trial over in The Hague by U.S. norms, that trial would be declared untryable, unactionable because of the pre-trial publicity; true?

MR. BLANKLEY: Possibly.


MR. BLANKLEY: Possibly. But the point is that you can't have even an assessment of what a fair trial is in the absence of a body of law and a sovereign that creates that law. So -- for instance, under the international -- the proposed International Criminal Court, there's no right to a jury, there's no right to a speedy trial. You have the prosecutor, who is also the trier of fact; you don't have the separation of powers between the prosecution and the judge.


MR. BLANKLEY: Yes. So that even if he could get a fair trial in the media sense of the word, he can't get a fair trial.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: No right of appeal.

MR. BLANKLEY: Now, I think that when you get somebody like Milosevic or Hitler, we have every right -- the victors -- to put him up against the wall and shoot him. But I don't think we have the right to abuse the concept of law in order to get --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: We all concur that the United States, within the lifetime of everyone watching this show -- John Bolton's statement -- will not see the United States become a member of the ICC.

MS. CLIFT: Not necessarily. There are some infants out there who might be propped up on a pillow watching! (Laughs.)

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: We'll be right back.


MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Predictions from our guests.

John Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: In very short order, the criticisms about Bush administration unilateralism will turn into praise for renewed American leadership.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: We have five seconds.


MR. GRESSER: Taiwan and China both enter the WTO next year. The main change is Taiwan and China becoming more economically integrated, the greatest chances of peace.



MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Issue four: Globalism versus the U.S. Constitution.

"I must express my disappointment over the conference's inability to agree, due to the concerns of one state, on language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls over private ownership of these deadly weapons."

The United States is the one state Camillo Reyes is referring to. Reyes is the president of the U.N. Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. In July of this year, delegates from more than 140 nations met in New York for this United Nations conference. The agenda was to establish a global regime of binding gun control laws to curb the trade in some 500 million small arms worldwide, more than 270 million of which are privately held here in the United States.

The one state that refused to go along with the proposed U.N. regiment, as noted, the United States of America. Two provisions were objectionable to the U.S. One would have prevented the U.S. from sending weapons to Afghan freedom fighters, to the contras, to Angola's UNITA movement, or if the agreement had been in force during World War II, to the French Resistance. The second would have banned private ownership of any, quote, "military," unquote, weapon, which has been determined by France to mean not just assault weapon, but any weapon of military caliber. By this standard, sporting rifles or handguns would be banned. The Bush administration refused to sign the global accord.

Question: The position of the Bush administration is that had we signed the agreement, it would have been in direct conflict with the Second Amendment of the Constitution, the right to keep and bear arms. Does our government ever have the power to sign away constitutional rights, any constitutional right, in a global accord?

I ask you, John Bolton. And we know that you have first-hand knowledge of this.

MR. BOLTON: Right. We have no --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Why do you have first-hand knowledge?

MR. BOLTON: Because I was up at the United Nations giving the good news of the Bush position to a happy audience there in the General Assembly. (Laughter.)

The idea that the United States should modify its constitutional structures or its domestic policy largely through international agreement rather than through domestic political debate is fundamentally wrong. And that was the point we were trying to make in New York.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: If this had been the Clinton or the Gore administration, do you think the United States would have taken a different view?

MR. BOLTON: I think that substantively, their position would have been the same, but I think they would have gone out of their way to try to appeal to the audience as they signed the International Criminal Court statute, although not intending to ratify it; as they signed the Kyoto Protocol, although not intending to ratify it. I just think that was their PR spin on things.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you approve of the position taken by the United States in this particular decision-making?

MR. GRESSER: I think John's basically right. We wind up with about the same substantive position. The Bush administration --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well you really jump back and forth across this issue, don't you?

MR. GRESSER: The Bush administration, instead of having the talking points you're talking about, had the National Rifle Association talking points. You know, the NRA put out a statement saying the U.N. is going to impose the nightmare of Britain and Australia and Canada on the American people. It was very silly. No one will ever change the Constitution.

MS. CLIFT: Yeah, that was not designed to take arms away from American citizens --


MS. CLIFT: -- and this is an inflated reason, the Second Amendment --

MR. BOLTON: No, no. No --

MS. CLIFT: -- in order to withdraw this --


MS. CLIFT: -- And I believe appeal to the gun constituency in this country for political reasons.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: John, will you straighten Eleanor out?

MR. BOLTON: Absolutely. Bad treaties from little acorns grow. And this is how it works in the U.N., starting with a small reference in an obscure document growing into treaty negotiations that become binding. And our effort was to step on the acorn at the front end.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that that same principle and conclusion could be applied to George Bush in rejecting the Kyoto treaty?

MR. BOLTON: That's exactly right. If the proponents of the policies embodied in Kyoto went to Congress to try to get them enacted as positive law in the U.S., they'd fail overwhelmingly. So instead, they went outside and got an international agreement. People would come and say, "Oh, but the United States is isolated." Well, the fact is that this is a backdoor way of getting a political objective they could not achieve domestically.